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PRESIDENT NIXON'S PRESCIENCE: THE
HONORABLE KEVIN THOMAS DUFFY
TIMOTHY JOHN CASEYt
Our Union is in quite a state. And why shouldn't it be? Foreign
terrorists and domestic corporate chiefs have sold short its sense of
security and plundered its reserves. Lady Liberty's posture has shifted
from that of a welcoming woman to a wary pugilist. It is still too early to
know, but not to wonder whether venues like the World Trade Center,
Kandahar, and Pyongyang will some day resonate along side other
poignant reminders of our Union's fragile state. It is, though, beyond
dispute that these are soul-trying times1 in desperate need of stand-up 2 men
and women. If ever there were an era in which to enjoin the decay of our
nation and its confidence, it is now.
Enter the Judge. The Honorable Kevin Thomas Duffy, Senior Judge
for the Southern District of New York, stands out among his distinguished
colleagues and personifies the judicial remedy needed for a twenty-first
century America that has come too close to irreparable harm. Keen
observers of our judiciary have aptly noted that federal trial judges wield
their Article Three power with fewer restraints than the Justices of the
United States Supreme Court.3  During his three-decade tenure on the
federal bench, this empowered jurist has deftly managed a docket with an
uncanny magnetism for dangerous defendants and thorny issues of
t B.A., 2001, Georgetown University; J.D., 2004, St. John's University School of Law. The
Author is grateful to the following individuals for their generosity of time and insight: The
Honorable P. Kevin Castel, Judge, United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York; Boris Kostelanetz, Esq.; Teri A. McManus, Esq.; and, of course, to the Honorable Kevin
Thomas Duffy for his time and for three decades of service worthy of a much more detailed
analysis than is provided here. John & Lorraine Casey are to parents as Kevin Duffy is to judges,
i.e., sui generis. I therefore dedicate this Essay to them with thanks.
I See THOMAS PAINE, The American Crisis: 1, in COMMON SENSE AND OTHER POLITICAL
WRITINGS 55 (Nelson F. Adkins ed., 1953) ("These are the times that try men's souls. The
summer soldier and the sunshine patriot will, in this crisis, shrink from the service of their
country; but he that stands it now, deserves the love and thanks of man and woman.").
2 Id.
The Honorable Barrington D. Parker, Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, Visiting Jurist Speaker, Remarks at St. John's University School of Law (Oct.
29, 2003). Judge Parker noted, for example, that a judge of the Second Circuit requires two other
signatures even to assign counsel.
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international importance. As individuals empowered by Article Two of
our Constitution shamelessly attempt to impinge upon the jurisdiction of
the courts, this judge stands out as living, breathing evidence of why such
attempts may not only be a fool's errand, but a terribly unconscionable and
perhaps even unconstitutional idea.4
Kevin Thomas Duffy's public service spans five decades during
which time he has donned a variety of hats. Most notably, he has worked
as an Assistant United States Attorney, a Regional Administrator for the
Securities and Exchange Commission, and a professor of law. This New
York lawyer has made numerous contributions as a prosecutor,
practitioner, and professor. They are, though, largely beyond the scope of
this piece. This Essay merely asserts that Kevin Thomas Duffy is a
paradigmatic judge for our troubled nation at the start of an already
tumultuous turning point in its history.6  In particular, he brings to the
4 Attorney General John Ashcroft, for example, has arguably impinged upon the
independence of the judiciary with a new plan to monitor and compile lists of federal judges who
make downward departures from the Sentencing Guidelines. See Alan Vinegrad, Deferred
Prosecution of Corporations, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 9, 2003, at 5 ("The Department of Justice has taken
a number of steps recently to combat what it sees as overly lenient practices by some federal
prosecutors and judges."). Judge Miner of the Second Circuit recently quipped that if the panel
on which he sat were to agree with the defense over the prosecution on a sentencing manner,
"you'll probably take our names and report them to the attorney general." Tom Perotta, Panel
Laments Lack of Judicial Discretion, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 28, 2003, at 1. Chief Justice William H.
Rehnquist, in his capacity as head of the Judicial Conference of the United States, has criticized
the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act of
2003, the law that "authorize[s] the collection of information on the sentencing habits of federal
judges." Id. While resigning from the federal bench, the Honorable John S. Martin of the
Southern District of New York voiced sharp criticism for the United States Sentencing
Guidelines and noted that he did not want "to be a part of our unjust criminal system." Zachary
Berman, Judge Martin Leaves Bench Critical of Sentencing Guidelines, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 15,
2003, at 1. Judge Martin also observed that he "find[s] most disturbing how much power
Congress has ceded to the Justice Department. This is a very dangerous system, when you give
the United States Attorney that much power and you have taken the discretion that should be in
sentencing out of the hands of [federal judges]." Id. (alteration in original). With respect to the
vast powers of government attorneys, Judge Duffy has commented that, "[h]e or she has the
august majesty of the sovereign behind his or her every utterance; the economic power in the
hands of some individual government lawyers can wreak total devastation on the average
citizen." Silverman v. Ehrlich Beer Corp., 687 F. Supp. 67, 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
5 From 1958 to 1959, Judge Duffy served as an Assistant United States Attorney. From
1959 to 1961, he was the Assistant Chief of the Criminal Division in the Southern District of
New York. From 1969 to 1972, he was the Regional Administrator for the Securities and
Exchange Commission in New York. The judge has taught at Brooklyn Law School, New York
University School of Law, Pace Law School, and Fordham University School of Law.
6 The Author is, of course, not alone in this view of Judge Duffy. For example, Judge Duffy
was selected to act as the mediator in the enormous Enron shareholder and bankruptcy actions.
See Anthony Lin, Southern District Mediator Named for Enron Litigants, N.Y. L.J., May 30,
2003, at 1. One week later, the judge recused himself due to his stock ownership in one of the
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disputes before him three signature qualities that make him an exemplar
for his colleagues on the bench and at the bar: (1) a distinctive, learned
appreciation of the expansive breadth of precedent; (2) an
uncompromisingly high expectation of the men and women who practice
before him; and (3) an utterly independent pen with which he attempts to
inject clarity and justice into the controversies that reach his courtroom. In
1972, with the advice and consent of the United States Senate, President
Richard Nixon vested Kevin Thomas Duffy with considerable powers.
This Essay posits the simple thesis that such power resides in gifted,
trustworthy hands.
I. AN OLD COURTHOUSE AND A YOUNG LAWYER
Few venues in New York County hold a candle to 40 Foley Square
when it comes to housing ghosts. Names like Friendly and Hand still
resonate within its walls and its opinions. There are, though, fewer and
fewer attorneys who can attest to first-hand encounters with these legal
giants whose writings, even today, bind our nation's most prestigious and
storied circuit. Judge Duffy benefits from an experiential knowledge of
these specters of the Second Circuit. He carries with him vivid memories
of their vibrant personas, keen senses of humor, and even a few burns of
his own from one of the hottest benches in New York's jurisprudential
history.
A. A Second Circuit "Baptism by Fire"
Attorneys often recall their first few appearances in court with
nostalgia and even a touch of humility. For a litigator, it is a rite of
passage that indelibly sears itself into one's memory. Kevin Duffy made
one of his first court appearances before none other than Judge Learned
Hand.7 To bring home the import of that statement to a non-lawyer, one
might analogize the experience to a first-century Christian in Rome
encountering a lion for the first time in the Coliseum. Judge Hand was
undeniably an imposing, awe-inspiring force from the bench, and his
abrasive inquisitions of attorneys who were fortunate enough to practice
before one of his panels are well documented. Boris Kostelanetz, 9 a man
interested parties. See Anthony Lin, Conner Takes Mediator Role in Enron Case, N.Y. L.J., June
18, 2003, at 1.
7 Interview with Kevin Thomas Duffy, Senior Judge, United States District Court for the
Southern District Of New York, at 40 Foley Square, New York, N.Y. (Sept. 25, 2003).
8 Interview with Boris Kostelanetz, Esq., Offices of Kostelanetz & Fink, in New York,
N.Y. (Sept. 18, 2003); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 142
(1990) (noting Judge Hand's "famous rudeness to lawyers at oral argument").
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whose photograph Noah Webster negligently omitted to place next to the
definition of "gentleman" in his famous dictionary, argued before Judge
Hand as a young Assistant United States Attorney. He recalls that "the
Foley Square Courthouse would literally shake when [Judge Hand] ran the
show." 10 Of Judge Hand's many oratorical gifts, Mr. Kostelanetz recalled
his "shout" most vividly after more than fifty years."
Despite having worked on the Second Circuit as a clerk earlier in
Judge Hand's tenure, 12 young Kevin Duffy's experience in the lion's den
was no aberration from the norm. Judge Duffy recalls the event as a
"tongue lashing,"'13 and he notes that among the many questions Hand had
for him on that day was whether or not he owned a dictionary.' 4 Later that
day in the courthouse cafeteria, Judge Hand approached Mr. Duffy and
assured him that his abuse was intentional but not mean spirited. Hand
explained that Duffy, having been grilled by a master, would now be better
equipped to practice before and interact with the rest of the Second
Circuit.' 5 Little did either man then know that Judge Hand had just
instructed a future judge of the Southern District of New York16 who
would on occasion sit by designation on panels of the very same circuit
from which the difficult initiation came. 7
B. Kevin Duff& as Sui Generis
This Essay grows out of an attempt to compare Judges Hand and
Duffy. The Author has been fortunate enough to meet with Judge Duffy
9 Mr. Kostelanetz has served as an Assistant United States Attorney for the Southern
District of New York, Special Assistant to the Attorney General of the United States, and Chief
of the War Frauds Section for the Department of Justice. He is today an internationally
recognized litigator in the taxation bar. Mr. Kostelanetz is known both for his exceptionally
warm, generous spirit and his excellence as a practicing attorney.
10 Interview with Boris Kostelanetz, supra note 8.
11 Id.
'2 In a memorial tribute to the Honorable David N. Edelstein, Judge Duffy describes his
position, "I remember David as a Federal Judge who as a man was kind to me when I was a
brash young Bailiff-Court Crier/Law Clerk to a Circuit Judge in the venerable New York City
Federal Courthouse at 40 Foley Square." Judge Kevin T. Duffy, David N. Edelstein: A Personal
Remembrance, 69 FORDHAM L. REv. 3, 3 (2000).
13 Interview with Kevin Thomas Duffy, supra note 7.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Judge Hand served as ajudge in the Southern District of New York from 1909 to 1924.
17 See, e.g., Conte v. Justice, 996 F.2d 1398 (2d Cir. 1993). For a markedly distinct
appellate panel on which the judge sat, see ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW
YORK, THE ELSINORE APPEAL: PEOPLE V. HAMLET (1996) [hereinafter THE ELSINORE APPEAL].
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on two occasions.' 8 After only a few moments of dialogue, it became
painfully apparent that any such comparison would be virtually fruitless.
In his demeanor, writing, and personality, Judge Duffy is sui generis, that
is, one of a kind. Any attempt at comparing the two would do a great
disservice to both judges. It is, though, worth mentioning that one of the
few ways in which Judge Duffy emulates Judge Hand is his ardent
appreciation for the independence of the judiciary and for the individuality
of the judges who compose it.' 9
C. Nursery Rhymes, Clerkships, and Clarity in Prose
Kevin Duffy served as a law clerk to the Honorable J. Edward
Lumbard of the Second Circuit during some of the halcyon days in the life
of the court.20  This position afforded him numerous opportunities to
interact with the famous circuit judges of that era. While it would be
virtually fruitless to compare Kevin Duffy to any one of these legendary
jurists, even the most independent individual cannot help but benefit from
an atmosphere such as this. One notable lesson from that era, as Judge
Duffy recalls, is a lecture from Judge Hand on the importance of clarity
when participating in any proceedings before the Second Circuit. "Kevin,
tell us the facts and the law. Put it in Mother Goose language.",21 As will
be discussed below, Judge Duffy has taken this admonition to heart.
II. A DISTINCTIVE APPROACH TO PRECEDENT
Judge Duffy has been fortunate enough to walk among and interact
with the authors of some of the Second Circuit's most celebrated opinions.
One can detect hints of this portion of the judge's background in reverent
allusions to these writers' excellence:
Judge Learned Hand was a master of the English language and Judge
Henry Friendly was a master of legal reasoning. Yet, a combination of
the two would have difficulty in figuring out exactly why Rockefeller
18 Interview with Kevin Thomas Duffy, supra note 7; The Honorable Kevin Thomas Duffy,
Senior Judge, United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Visiting Jurist
Speaker, Remarks at St. John's University School of Law (Oct. 2003).
19 Interview with Kevin Thomas Duffy, supra note 7.
20 See James Oakes, Personal Reflections on Learned Hand and the Second Circuit, 47
STAN. L. REv. 387, 387 (1995) (treating the history of the Second Circuit during Judge Hand's
tenure and noting "Hand's tenure stretched from 1924 to 1961.... it was during that time that
the [court], stimulated by the growth of the Eastern Seaboard and aided by some of the finest
minds on the federal bench, rose to fame.").
21 Interview with Kevin Thomas Duffy, supra note 7.
2004]
THE CA THOLIC LA WYER
Group, Inc. and Rockefeller Center Properties have brought this case to
this court at this time.
22
In addition to the genuine first-hand familiarity with which Judge
Duffy can cite to a Hand or Friendly opinion, his judicial and extra-judicial
writings are marked by his reliance upon an expansive field of precedential
authority.
A. Ancient Origins ofLitigation
In assessing the merits of a legal argument or interpreting the
meaning of a contractual provision, judges may look to a variety of
precedential sources. In perhaps its broadest definition of the term,
Black's defines "precedent" as "[a] course of conduct once followed which
may serve as a guide for future conduct. 23 A judge's raison d'etre, it can
be argued, is to evaluate a panoply of authorities and appeal to those which
most directly lead to a just adjudication of the case at bar.2 4 One hallmark
of Judge Duffy's jurisprudence is the array of authorities to which the
judge appeals. That is, his writings manifest an acute awareness that the
particular dispute at hand is not likely to be entirely novel. Instead, the
controversy lies upon a timeline that extends far back into history. In his
own words:
Wearing a black robe does not assure one of getting a direct pipeline to
the Almighty or even a peek at what Platonists would call absolutes or
ideals. Our law is the perception of the judges as to what the customs of
society are-as such customs might evolve from a sense of absolute
justice. Thus, the law changes.25
This concise portrayal of the legal process consistently rings true in
the writings of the judge. It is also illustrative of the Judge's keen
awareness of the ancient origins of the legal process and the gradual
changes that take place in American "customs."
B. Adam and Eve on the Stand
Nowhere is the judge's sense of the ancient underpinnings of the
litigation process more apparent than in the opening chapter of his text on
22 48th Street Steakhouse, Inc. v. Rockefeller Group, Inc., 77 B.R. 409, 410 (S.D.N.Y.
1987).
23 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1176 (6th ed. 1990).
24 Cf Jack Van Doren, Is Jurisprudence Politics By Other Means? The Case of Learned
Hand, 33 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1, n.1 (1998) ("A wise judge chooses, among plausible
constitutional philosophies, one that will generally allow him to reach results he can believe in.")
(quoting Justice Hugo Black, in ROGER NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK: A BIOGRAPHY 435 (1997)).
25 Kevin Thomas Duffy, Remarks at the Law Day Luncheon at Fordham University School
of Law (May 10, 1995).
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the cross-examination of witnesses.26 The chapter, entitled "The Genesis
of Cross-Examination: Examination of Witnesses in Biblical Times and in
Other Historical Epochs," literally begins at the beginning 27 and constitutes
an expansive historical treatment of cross-examination in various
civilizations throughout history. The piece spans Babylonia, Greece,
Rome and concludes in nineteenth-century England.28
The piece also contains a pocket part. Therein one finds the
biographical window into the mind of one of its authors. Even the most
accomplished reference librarian would be hard-pressed to locate another
text that not only covers Solon and Quintilian29 but also has a cumulative
annual supplement. The reason for this is simple: Babylonians and pocket
parts make strange bedfellows, but not in the mind of Kevin Duffy.30 The
chapter, at the start of a pragmatic text on cross-examination, is illustrative
of the way in which the judge weaves well-worn precedent into modern
decision making.
C. Mt. Sinai and Cold Chillin'Records:3t The Convergence of an Unlikely
Twain
32
In arguably his most celebrated application of an ancient doctrine to a
seemingly modern dispute, the judge looked to the Book of Exodus to
explain his resolution of a case involving musical licensing.33 The case
essentially involved the question of who owned the copyright to the hit
song, "Alone Again (Naturally)." In reaching his decision to grant a
preliminary injunction to the plaintiffs, Judge Duffy wrote:
26 ROBERTO ARON ET AL., CROSS-EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES: THE LITIGATOR'S
PUZZLE 1 (1989).
27 See id. at 2. The authors cite to Genesis 3:9-13 and observe that God's interrogation of
Adam may have "establish[ed] mankind's right and authority to ask questions, and the
obligations of the questioned person to answer." Id.
28 See id. at 1.
29 Id. at21,23.
30 The authors reconcile the pragmatic nature of the text and its initial appeal to history:
Before a trial, lawyers usually have neither the time nor the will to study scholars'
writings about the different parts of the judicial process. Although it may seem
ludicrous to suggest that lawyers read about the different components of advocacy as
well as the roots of legal institutions, we do so because we believe that such study will
provide a fascinating world of knowledge which will facilitate the understanding of
both the matters at hand and the sources of the ideas studied.
Id. at2.
31 Cold Chillin' Records was a defendant in Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros.
Records, 780 F. Supp. 182, 183 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
32 See THOMAS HARDY, The Convergence of the Twain, in COLLECTED POEMS OF THOMAS
HARDY 288 (1972).
" Grand Upright, 780 F. Supp. at 183.
2004]
THE CA THOLIC LAWYER
"Thou shalt not steal" has been an admonition followed since the dawn of
civilization. Unfortunately, in the modem world of business this
admonition is not always followed. Indeed, the defendants in this action
for copyright infringement would have this court believe that stealing is
rampant in the music business and, for that reason, their conduct here
should be excused. The conduct of the defendants herein, however,
violates not only the Seventh Commandment, but also the copyright laws
of this country. 
4
As one commentator describes it, "[w]ith the mere restatement of an
ancient fundamental adage. . . a recent federal district court decision has
finally resolved an area of much legal debate. 35 The markedly distinct
order stands out not only for its unique invocation of ancient dogma, but
also for its steadfast refusal to accept the argument that digital sampling
should be permitted because it has become commonplace in the music
industry.36  As noted above, Judge Duffy has described his role on the
bench as an interpreter of "customs of society... as such customs might
evolve from a sense of absolute justice.,37 It is a two-part test, and the
defendants in the instant action did not meet its rigorous second
benchmark. The judge, therefore, referred the civil matter to the United
States Attorney for the Southern District of New York for the possible
criminal prosecution of the defendants.38
D. "No Documents Satisfy Your Query"
If one were to type "United States In the Matter of Rachmones" into a
standard legal search engine such as Westlaw or LexisNexis, an error
34 Id. For an equally fascinating instance of the judge's appeal to ancient principles, see In
re Medway Power, 985 F.Supp. 402 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). The lawyers in that case faced a series of
historical questions at oral arguments. Id. at 403 ("At oral arguments, I asked petitioner's counsel
a series of hypotheticals concerning what weight he would give to rulings of tribunals, such as a
feudal patriarch or a Bet Din (Jewish religious court).").
3' Erick J. Bohlman, Comment, Squeezing the Square Peg of Digital Sound Sampling into
the Round Hole of Copyright Law: Who Will Pay the Piper? 5 SOFTwARE L.J. 797, 798 (1992).
The author qualifies his praise by noting "the opinion did not resolve all related legal issues,
particularly regarding controversial practices in which artists sample single notes of a
copyrighted work or electronically manipulate samples." Id. at 789-799; see also Louise
Harmon, Law, Art, and the Killing Jar, 79 IOWA L. REV 367, 401 n.1 12 (1994) (calling Judge
Duffy's ruling an instance of the "ire" of the court with respect to the practice of digital
sampling); Michael L. Baroni, Comment, A Pirate's Palette: The Dilemma of Digital Sound
Sampling and a Proposed Compulsory License Solution, 11 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REv
65, 89-90 (1993).
36 Grand Upright, 780 F. Supp. at 183.
37 Kevin Thomas Duffy, supra note 25.
38 Grand Upright, 780 F. Supp. at 185 ("This callous disregard for the law and for the rights
of others requires not only the preliminary injunction sought by the plaintiff but also sterner
measures.").
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message like the one stated above would almost certainly appear. That is
because there simply is no such decision. This minor detail did not stop
Judge Duffy from referring to this "case" when sentencing a criminal
defendant in the summer of 1993. 39
The facts of the case, much more at home amidst the pages of a work
by Clancy or Le Carrd than in the Federal Supplement,40 involved a Jewish
FBI translator who warned an innocent fellow Jew that he was unwittingly
involving himself in a dangerous enterprise. 4' Elefant, the defendant-
protagonist, reads as a sympathetic character, who even went so far as to
consult his rabbi before deciding to carry out his religious obligations to
warn the innocent man in contravention of federal law.42 In an apparent
response to the "extraordinary facts of the case,''43 Judge Duffy made a
downward departure from the applicable range in the Sentencing
Guidelines and sentenced the defendant to eighteen months imprisonment
and three years of supervised release, as opposed to the statutory twenty-
seven-month minimum.44 Notably, the judge made reference in his
sentencing to "the case of United States In the Matter of Rachmones. ''4
Rachmones, the Yiddish word for compassion, was a subtle, insider's
reference to the reasons underlying the downward departure.46
E. A Human Being on the Bench
Like his colleagues, Judge Duffy does not appear to enjoy sentencing
the individuals convicted in his courtroom. 47 Though he does not relish the
task, he brings to it his hallmark reliance upon tested wisdom. In the
instance outlined below, 48 the judge considered the defendant, his crime,
39 See Jonathan Groner, Religious Conscience Versus the Law, LEGAL TIMES, June 7, 1993,
at 1.
40 The trial court's ruling was not published in the Federal Supplement.
41 See Groner, supra note 39, at 1.
42 Judge Newman, author of the excellent opinion on appeal, begins "This appeal is a sad
tale of high moral teachings gone awry.... Mindful of the Biblical command, 'Thou
shalt ... not suffer sin upon [thy neighbor],' Leviticus 19:17, he sought the advice of his rabbi."
United States v. Elefant, 999 F.2d 674, 675 (2d Cir. 1993).
43 Id. at 676.
44Id
45 Groner, supra note 39, at 4.
46 See id. ("Duffy was alluding to a courthouse joke that goes back decades in the Southern
District, in which a non-Jewish judge who knows his Yiddish bamboozles a patrician lawyer
with the non-existent citation.").
47 See, e.g., United States v. Jacobson, No. 92 CR. 0724, 1993 WL 361588, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 15, 1993) ("I know of no trial judge who takes pleasure in sentencing.").
48 In an analogous scenario, Judge Duffy sentenced a promising young trader. See Ex-U of
I. Student Gets 3 Years for Insider Scam, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 27, 1988, at Cl ("Stephen Wang Jr., a
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and, perhaps most notably, the gifted nature of the individual standing
before him.
1. US. v. Jacobson: An "Apologia" to the Second Circuit
Andrew Kogut, a pharmacist and seemingly successful businessman,
pleaded guilty to "conspiring to distribute and distributing illegal
prescription drugs ' 49 before Judge Duffy. In particular, Kogut sold
pharmaceuticals to his unsuspecting customers that had been obtained in
"an illegal prescription drug diversion scheme., 50  The judge sentenced
him to twelve months in prison and fined him $10,000. 51 Notably, the
judge did not impose comparable sentences on any of Kogut's co-
defendants who also pleaded guilty to selling illegally obtained
pharmaceuticals.52
In an extraordinarily unusual maneuver, the Second Circuit panel to
which Kogut's appeal was assigned solicited the input of Judge Duffy in
order to understand the reason for this sentencing disparity.53 His response
is a testament to both the discretionary powers of a trial judge and the
reasoned exercise thereof. The author of this succinct and sometimes
scathing "apologia ' 54 described the difference between Kogut and his co-
defendants, "It was Mr. Kogut's superior abilities, his intelligence, his
experience as well as his good fortune, which made his actions all the more
culpable. Quite simply, Mr. Kogut should have known better., 55  The
Opinion, an eloquent, defensive explanation of the human ingredient in
sentencing calculations, has the judge's fingerprints all over it. From a
citation to Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's Gulag Archipelago,56 to its subtly
former trainee with Morgan Stanley and Co., was sentenced Wednesday to three years in prison
for his involvement in the second largest insider-trading case in U.S. history.").
49 Jacobson, 1993 WL 361588, at *1.
50 Id.
5' Id.
52 Id. at *4 ("Although Mr. Kogut asserts that his 'criminal behavior was indistinguishable
from that of six of the eight sentenced co-defendants,' I disagreed then and disagree now."); see
also Daniel Wise, Justificationfor Higher Sentence Offered, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 20, 1993, at 1 ("The
term was more than twice as long as that given to any of the other 10 pharmacists who also had
pleaded guilty to charges of selling black-market prescription drugs.").
3 Jacobson, WL 361588, at *1 ("To the best of my knowledge, there is no procedure to
request a trial judge's view of the issues presented in an outstanding appeal. The Court of
Appeals, however, in an order dated August 25, 1993, has requested my comments in this
matter.") (citation omitted).
54 Id. at * 1 ("Therefore, I take pen in hand and submit this as my apologia.").
51 Id. at *3.
56 Jacobson, WL 361588, at *4 (writing that "Congress could have created a different
system if it had so wished. For example, a defendant could be sentenced by committee, operating
academically and avoiding all human contact with the defendant, toting up non-human
[Vol.43:443
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articulated wonderment at the circuit panel's decision to question the
judge,57 it is an extremely satisfying rationale of what must have appeared
to the appellate court as a seemingly irreconcilable set of sentences. It also
arguably contains hints of the Lucan parable from which we receive the
instructive adage, "To whom much is given, much will be expected., 58
III. SETTING A HIGH BAR FOR THE LEGAL PROFESSION
From attorneys, to whom much responsibility and esteem has been
given by our nation, Judge Duffy expects much. In the Jacobson
sentencing, the judge observed that the defendant's customers "relied on
his expertise and professionalism. 59  In addition to being an important
factor in assessing Kogut's guilt, the observation may also serve to
illuminate the exceptionally high standards to which this jurist holds his
fellow members of the bar who practice before him. By representing their
clients in federal court-and in this courtroom in particular-lawyers opt
to take on a gravely important duty.
A. "Insults " Great and Small
The judge's admonitions directed at the practicing bar grow out of an
appreciation for the cumulative impact of malpractice on the profession
and society at large. In his own words:
I must point out that our civilization is being eroded not only by the
criminals in our society, but also by the little insults that we wreak upon
our culture. The lawyer who overbills his or her clients not only damages
them, but that lawyer diminishes himself or herself by attacking the trust
that Everyman should have for the law. Certainly the lazy judge attacks
the fabric of our civilization in a different way than the corrupt judge-
but, both do damage to it.
60
Among the sources of his disappointment with the profession in its
present state appear to be the deleterious effects of the hourly billing
considerations to impose mandated terms of imprisonment" and citing Solzhenitsyn's description
of such an alternative sentencing system).
17 Id. at *4 ("1 should have hoped that after twenty years on the bench, my motives required
no explanation.").
58 Luke 12:48 (New American).
59 Jacobson, WL 361588, at *1. For a high-profile instance of the judge's unwavering
stance on the duty of an attorney to all his or her clients regardless of the notoriety of any one of
those clients, see Simpson v. Rothwax, No. 94 Civ. 8704, WL 681844, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2,
1994) ("Mr. Neufelds' position in the Gil case is no different than that of any other lawyer who
undertakes the defense of a criminal case and then finds a more interesting or lucrative matter
presented.").
60 Kevin T. Duffy, The Needfor Values, N.Y. L.J., May 10, 1995, at 2.
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system of the modem American law firm.6 1  In a strongly worded
Memorandum involving, in part, the award of attorneys' fees, the judge
lashed out at the bar and this practice. In particular, he warned of the
potential for "indolence, lack of imagination and down-right
incompetence ' 62 rooted in the compensation system. With typical color
and literary emphasis, he considered the applicability of Dickens's Bleak
House to the present-day case.63 It should be noted, to complete the
picture, that the judge is just as likely to reward excellent lawyering as he
is to condemn malpractice. When he encounters officers of the court who
are worth their salt, he does not begrudge them their just praise or purse.
In one notable instance, the judge even awarded the attorneys more in the
way of fees than were requested in their application.64
B. "The Eastern Intercollegiate Records in Sentencing"
65
In his often-quoted line from Walden, Henry David Thoreau notes
that "obsequious attendance" without "sincerity and truth" would not
61 On numerous occasions, Judge Duffy has set forth his articulate dissatisfaction with the
practice of hourly billing, or more precisely, the apparent abuse thereof. See In re Ames
Department Stores, No. 93 Civ. 2192, 1995 WL 338253, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 7, 1995) ("Too
many members of the bankruptcy bar have grown accustomed to submitting 'billable hours'
without regard to anything other than their own profit. It is for all of them that I now take pen in
hand."). Judge Duffy participated in a symposium discussion on Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Amended Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: How Go the Best
Laid Plans? 54 FORDHAM L. REv. 1 (1985). The judge's remarks constitute a well-supported and
sometimes lighthearted defense of the Rule. See id. at 20 ("One of the reasons for Rule 11 is to
get rid of stupid, senseless, baseless lawsuits brought not by pro se litigants but by
lawyers.... Rule 11 is intended to terrorize unethical lawyers bringing baseless lawsuits. What
is so wrong with that?").
62 Katz v. Pels, No. 90 Civ. 7787, 1992 WL 163152, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 23, 1992).
63 Id. ("Dickens' comments in Bleak House about the lawyers involved in Jarndyce v.
Jarndyce still may be applicable to the hourly billed case today."); see also Michael C.
Silberberg, Reductions in Award of Attorneys' Fees, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 6, 1992, at 3 ("Judge
Duffy's opinion is garnished with strident language.").
64 Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Volume Investors Corp., No. 85 Civ. 2213,
1990 WL 170508, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 1990) ("In this case, the work of the attorneys and the
receiver was of the highest caliber ... their professionalism, innovation, and dedication to high
ethical standards should be rewarded."). Despite a willingness to praise others when it is
warranted, the judge does not appear to stand on ceremony. See Richard Bernstein, Holding
Court in Bombing Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1993, at 35 ("[The judge] walks into court every
day in the same fashion, telling people to 'sit down, sit down' as soon as he is through the door
and well before he has actually reached the bench, as if the rituals of respect normal in any
judicial proceeding are incompatible with such an unpretentious man of the people.").
65 See THE ELSINORE APPEAL, supra note 17 ("I have a feeling that the question of
sentencing came up because a suggestion was made by someone that I hold the Eastern
Intercollegiate Records in Sentencing.").
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satisfy his appetite.66 Like this famous naturalist, Judge Duffy counts on
the honesty and attendance of lawyers representing individuals on his
docket. Failure to meet both prongs of this test inevitably leads to severe
consequences. In one telling case, Julio Cesar Rojas, a criminal defense
lawyer, failed to appear in court on behalf of his client'on two separate
67occasions. After being warned of the consequences of a third absence,
Mr. Rojas once again failed to appear.68 Judge Duffy responded by issuing
a bench warrant for his arrest and ultimately sentenced him to a three-
month prison sentence for being in contempt of court. 69 Reminding the bar
that presence is a sine qua non of effective advocacy, the judge asked Mr.
Rojas, "How well do you represent clients when you don't show up?" 70
C. A Reminder to the Justice Department
The judge undoubtedly holds attorneys to exceptionally high
standards. 71  Lawyers are, of course, not the only individuals entrusted
with the administration of justice in our nation. The judge therefore
reserves neither his ink nor his "ire, 72 for the practicing bar. During the
highly publicized trial of the six defendants charged in connection with the
armed robbery of a Brinks truck and the murder of three individuals, 73 the
judge issued an Opinion and Order that required an immediate end to
conditions of pre-trial confinement that he determined were "punitive. 74
66 HENRY DAVID THOREAU, Walden, in WRITINGS OF HENRY DAVID THOREAU (2002).
Thoreau famously describes his dissatisfaction:
I sat at a table where were rich food and wine in abundance, and obsequious
attendance, but sincerity and truth were not; and I went away hungry from the
inhospitable board. The hospitality was as cold as the ices. I thought that there was no
need of ice to freeze them.
Id. at 364.
67 See Deborah Pines, Duffy Jails Criminal Defense Lawyer for Contempt, N.Y. L.J., Oct.
26, 1994, at 1.
68 id.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 The judge has described special standards applicable to government lawyers. See
Silverman v. Ehrlich Beer Corp., 687 F. Supp. 67, 69-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) ("First, an attorney in
the employ of the government is not on the same footing as a private attorney.... the attorney
representing the government must be held to a higher standard than that of the ordinary
lawyer.").
72 See Harmon, supra note 35, at 401 n. 112.
73 Boudin v. Thomas, 533 F. Supp. 786 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
74 See id at 791 ("The punitive nature of Ms. Boudin's confinement is further reinforced by
her singular treatment.... To date, she has never been convicted of any crimes."). The
conditions of Boudin's pre-trial confinement included: not being allowed to have contact visits
with her infant child and "restricted confinement in her cell for the majority of the day, inability
to go to the law library, or participate in the available educational programs or utilize the
recreation area." Id.
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The Opinion is a very specific, carefully reasoned disapproval of
needlessly punishing a young mother in the custody of the correctional
system. It begins with a lengthy, eloquent reminder of certain
"fundamental principles" pertaining to the "[l]iberty [of] all Americans. '75
In sum, the writing is a quintessential admonition of the judge-concise,
filled with telling examples, and sharply worded.
IV. THE LONG ARM OF THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT
It is not unusual for decisions rendered by the judges of the Southern
District of New York to have far-reaching and often international
implications. Major corporations, high profile criminal defendants, and
foreign sovereigns are no stranger to its brimming docket of cases.
Throughout much of his tenure, Judge Duffy has presided over such
disputes on the world's stage. To these controversies, all too often
pregnant with the potential for chaotic drama, the judge has lent an
authoritative but neutral pen and presence.
75 Id. at 787. The introductory paragraph is the heart of the Opinion and Order. Devoid of a
single citation, it states:
Liberty for all Americans, no matter to what philosophy they may adhere, is based
upon reasonable restraints on individual action imposed for the common good. These
restraints are embraced by Americans as a guarantee of their freedom and are found in
our laws, rules and regulations. They are to be enforced in a totally nondiscriminatory
manner. Adherence to these principles both by individuals and by government
officials cannot be avoided because of mass hysteria over the alleged revolutionary
ideas of an individual nor from the craven fear of criticism from the mass media. It is
embarrassing for this court to have to remind the United States Department of Justice
and its representatives of these fundamental principles; yet it appears necessary to do
so in this matter.
Id For another example of Judge Duffy's dissatisfaction with the pre-trial conditions of
confinement of a defendant in a highly publicized criminal case, see Warden Scolded on N. Y.
Bomb Suspect's Treatment, WASH. POST, June 1, 1995, at A3. The article discusses and
describes Judge Duffy's admonition to the warden of the Metropolitan Correctional Center for
the alleged treatment of Ramzi Yousef, who at the time was accused of planning the 1993
bombing of the World Trade Center. The article observes, "[Judge Duffy] scolded [the warden]
of the Metropolitan Correctional Center for allowing guards to take everything from toothpaste
to the Koran away from [the] defendant .... 'This case.., is being watched by the entire
civilized and perhaps uncivilized world,' Duffy said." Id.; see also Peg Tyre, Judge Scolds
Warden: Terror Suspect's Rights at Issue, NEWSDAY, June 1, 1995, at A7 ("[Judge Duffy]
ordered the warden of the [prison] to take the witness stand and sharply criticized him for using
draconian security measures .... [the judge] ordered [the warden] to file a formal affidavit
explaining why he had violated Yousef's civil rights."). The article goes on to quote the judge as
saying, "Whether you realize it or not, you are responsible.., for feeding those who would be
against this country in foreign lands, with ammunition as to this country being totally and
completely insensitive." Id. (alteration in original).
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A. Iranian Assets and an Administration's "Wrath " 7 6
On November 4, 1979, Americans working in the United States
Embassy in Tehran, Iran were taken hostage." After being held for four
hundred and forty-four days, fifty-two Americans were finally released. 8
The interim and aftermath of this historic standoff wreaked havoc on
America's national confidence.79  American courtrooms simultaneously
hosted a less heart-rending, but equally complex drama that became known
as the "Iranian Asset Litigations. In the Southern District alone, ninety-
six distinct suits were brought, each of which were essentially based upon
"the government of Iran, its agencies and instrumentalities, hav[ing]
expressed an unequivocal intention of avoiding their just debts.' As
cases poured into court, the aggregate sums involved quickly escalated to
"many billions of dollars., 8 2 With the progression of the litigation and the
escalation of national tensions, the pages of the federal reporters began to
brim with Executive Orders, "severed ... diplomatic ties, 83 and the murky
contours of sovereign immunity.
84
When federal trial dockets wake up in the middle of the night in a
cold sweat, they have in all likelihood just dreamt of the consolidation of
ninety-six actions such as these. In early 1980, this nightmarish ball of
legal and political twine rolled into Judge Duffy's courtroom. 85 Several
76 See Amy L. Kearse, Sketches of 3 Judges Who Prohibited Primary, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10,
1981, at B7. ("[During the crisis] Judge Duffy ruled on a series of financial actions by the
Administration .... He incurred the wrath of the Carter Administration by issuing what it
considered 'ambiguous' rulings.").
77 Jimmy Carter Library & Museum, The Hostage Crisis in Iran, at
http://jimmycarterlibrary.org/documents/hostages.phtml (last visited on Oct. 18, 2004).
78 See Steven R. Weisman, Reagan Takes Oath as 40th President, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21,
1981, at Al.
79 Charles G. LaBella, The Iranian Litigation: Implications for American Business
Interests, 3 CARDOZO L. REv. 195, 196 n.4 (1982) ("What followed in Iran were 13 months of
captivity for the American citizens. In the United States, the American people kept a constant
vigil for their countrymen...").
80 See Kevin Thomas Duffy, Foreign Sovereign Immunity in the Second Circuit After Texas
Trading and Verlinden, 48 BROOK. L. REv. 979, 980 n.10 (1982).
81 New England Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Iran Power Generation & Transmission Co., 502
F. Supp. 120, 122 n.1. (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
82 Marschalk Co. v. Iran Nat'l Airlines Corp., 518 F. Supp. 69, 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
83 Iran Power, 502 F. Supp. at 122.
84 For a commentary on the topic of sovereign immunity by the judge, see generally Duffy,
supra note 80.
85 See LaBella, supra note 79, passim, for an excellent discussion of the clash between the
"enormous constitutional powers of the President as the chief architect of foreign affairs" and
"the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976... through which Congress directed that the
administration of commercial claims against foreign sovereigns, including the question of
sovereign immunity, shall rest with the federal judiciary."
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preliminary tasks initially fell to the judge, including resolution of disputes
over service of process, 86 foreign sovereign immunity from the pre-
judgment attachment of assets,87 and the effect of President Carter's
actions on the status of Iran in an American courtroom. 88  Ultimately,
Judge Duffy, found that the President exceeded his powers when he issued
executive orders which "inter alia nullified the orders of attachment and
transferred a portion of the attached Iranian assets out of this country for
eventual return to Iran.,8 9  In so ruling, the judge found himself in the
distinct minority of federal courts that had confronted the thorny issue.90
Ultimately, Judge Duffy's views differed from those of the United States
Supreme Court, which was "not prepared to say that the President lacks the
power to settle such claims." 9' Despite this difference of opinion, Judge
Duffy's judicial writings from this era remain a valid, fruitful assessment
of the crisis's impact on the separation of powers in our nation.92
If the reader has ever wondered what Article Three of our
Constitution looks and feels like, she may simply run her eyes and fingers
across the pages of the Federal Supplement on which Judge Duffy treated
the thorny cases born of this crisis. The judge brings his trademark
pedagogy, clarity, and utter independence to an unsettling morass of
competing interests, treaties, and power struggles. Portions of the
Opinions and Orders issued during the controversy arguably even fit
within what Judge Posner has referred to in the context of judicial writings
as "literature," or "the body of texts that survive the context in which they
86 New England Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Iran Power Generation & Transmission Co., 495
F. Supp. 73, 77-78 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
87 See Iran Power, 502 F. Supp. at 126-27.
88 Id. at 126 ("Additionally, there is the question of what effect, if any, do the President's
actions in dealing with the Iranian situation have upon that foreign state's entitlement to
immunity from pre-judgment attachment."); see also LaBella, supra note 79, at 246 ("During the
fury of the crisis, the courts were asked to apply vague, and at times conflicting, statutory
provisions to an ever-changing and politically volatile situation.").
89 Marschalk Co. v. Iran Nat'l Airlines Corp., 518 F. Supp. 69, 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
90 See, e.g., Am. Int'l Group, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 657 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir.
1981).
91 Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 688 (1981); see also LaBella, supra note 79, at
246 ("The Court, it seemed, was compelled to avoid the international diplomatic fallout likely to
ensue if the Agreement was held unconstitutional.").
92 The lower court opinions in the Iranian Assets Litigation remain didactic to this day. See
LaBella, supra note 79, at 198 ("Now that the exigencies of the Iranian situation are over, one is
tempted to say that the affair involved a situation not likely to be repeated.... The realities of the
present international situation... belie any such complacency."). LaBella also noted that "Judge
Duffy's conclusion appears to be supported by the legislative history of the [Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act]." Id. at 241 n.231.
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were created because they speak to us today. 93  To select one among
several such portions:
This is a court of law before which all parties stand equal. I preside over
these actions not as a patriot, but rather as a judicial officer, sworn to
faithfully and impartially discharge all the duties incumbent upon me as a
United States District Judge. However, my oath of office does not
require that I decide legal issues in a vacuum nor in an ivory tower
removed from the clamor of reality. Such is the task of legal scholars.
Instead, I must resolve issues in the context of the real world. Mindful of
these basic principles, I turn to consider the legal questions at hand.
94
In passages such as these, the reader can detect not only a commitment to
neutrality but also a genuine judicial self-awareness. That is, the judge
continually reminds95 the reader of the surroundings-a courtroom-and
goes to great lengths to find a middle ground between the flurry of media
activity surrounding the crisis in Iran and the "ivory tower."
B. A Docket with an Uncanny Magnetism for Thorny Issues and
Dangerous Defendants
New York City is reputed to be the city that does not sleep. Its courts
and those who work in them can, at times, commiserate with their
surroundings in this respect. It is not insomnia that keeps the judges and
law clerks from their rest, but a seemingly endless parade of litigants with
time-sensitive disputes that demand the immediate attention of the court.
93 POSNER, supra note 8, at 143 (citing generally JOHN M. ELLIS, THE THEORY OF
LITERARY CRITICISM: A LOGICAL ANALYSIS (1974)).
94 New England Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Iran Power Generation & Transmission Co., 502
F. Supp. 120, 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
95 Such reminders are vivid and sharply worded. See New England Merchants Nat'l Bank v.
Iran Power Generation and Transmission Co., 495 F. Supp 73, 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) ("This court
must.., reject entirely the blatant jingoist appeals to emotionalism offensively put forth by at
least one attorney involved in these proceedings. It is with a sense of deep sadness that I must
remind even one person that this is a court of law and justice."). There is no shortage of equally
poignant descriptions of the difficulty of deciding these matters amidst a heated political climate.
See Marschalk Co. v. Iran Nat'l Airlines, 518 F. Supp. 69, 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
Before closing, I wish to add a few general observations. Perhaps, it would have
been more felicitous for this court merely to adopt the reasoning proffered by the
government. That could have eventually led to a quick and facially clean resolution of
the knotty problem presented by the instant situation. The Constitution, however, will
not allow it. My responsibility to future generations and the continuation of
constitutional government in this country will not allow it.
The Presidents are not to be condemned for the actions they took, for among the
prime benefits obtained was the release of those held as hostages. Now that the
hostages have been released and the crisis no longer bums hot, a calm and
dispassionate review is possible.
2004]
THE CA THOLIC LAWYER
On February 26, 1993, Judge Duffy issued a Memorandum and Order that
directed New York City "not to interfere with the conduct of the [Ancient
Order of Hibernians's] 1993 New York St. Patrick's Day Parade by
requiring the inclusion of any contingent which has not been approved by
the [Hibernians] and the Parade Committee." 96 That very day, terror came
to lower Manhattan as the World Trade Center was attacked for the first
time.97 The criminal trials associated with the bombing and other terrorist
conspiracies98 would subsequently make the short, cross-town trip to Judge
Duffy's courtroom.
The trials would be historic events in the life of 40 Foley Square. The
pool of potential jurors is a telling symbol of the complexities that
pervaded even the most preliminary stages of the process. Due to the
massive media coverage surrounding the bombing and its aftermath,
impaneling an impartial and untainted band of New Yorkers was
exceptionally complex. Judge Duffy sent out 5,000 summonses, which
was "perhaps the largest number of jury summonses ever sent out in this
district." 99  The scope of the damage and its unprecedented nature in
America also foreshadowed that this would be a markedly distinct trial.
Contemporary commentators referred to the bombing as "the worst
terrorist assault ever to take place on American soil," and noted that not
only were six individuals killed but more than 1,000 individuals sustained
injuries.100 Also, there was reportedly 500 million dollars in damage to the
building and surrounding areas. 01
Judge Duffy's rulings throughout the two trials garnered extensive
media attention and critique.10 2 One of the most significant and concise
assessments came, only recently, from the Second Circuit. In a per curiam
96 N.Y. County Bd. of Ancient Order of Hibemians v. Dinkins, 814 F. Supp. 358, 370
(S.D.N.Y. 1993).
97 Douglas Jehl, A Tool of Foreign Terror, Little Known in the U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27,
1993, at L24 ("[I]f the explosion that rocked the World Trade Center today was indeed caused by
a car bombing, as the F.B.I. believes, it would be the largest such attack in American history,
experts said.").
98 Judge Duffy also presided over a trial related to a plan to blow up twelve American
commercial airplanes. See United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 79 (2d Cir. 2003) ("The plot to
bomb the United States-flag airliners was uncovered in January 1995, only two weeks before the
conspirators intended to carry it out.").
" Bomb Judge Casts Wide Juror Net, THE COMMERCIAL APPEAL, Aug. 7, 1993, at A2
(quoting Judge Duffy); see also John J. Goldman, Judge in Trade Center Case Weighs Trial
Move to Ohio, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 7, 1993, at A2.
10o Richard Bernstein, NY Bombers Given 240 Years Each, DENVER POST, May 25, 1994,
at Al.
101 Id.
112 See, e.g., District Judge Duffy Takes Tough Stance with Attorneys, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 14,
1993, at 1.
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opinion, the Second Circuit observed, "Judge Duffy carefully, impartially,
and commendably conducted the two lengthy and extraordinarily complex
trials from which these appeals were taken. The fairness of the
proceedings over which he presided is beyond doubt." 10 3 Since the Second
Circuit has captured the excellence with which the judge managed these
extraordinarily challenging proceedings, this Essay will only briefly point
out three aspects of the trial that seem especially relevant to a portrait of
the judge.
1. Grounds for Recusal
Being a trial judge can be an extraordinarily dangerous and thankless
occupation. Kevin Duffy is walking, heavily guarded proof of the many
unsung sacrifices that accompany a black robe in one's wardrobe. As a
result of credible threats, United States Marshals guard Judge Duffy
twenty-four hours a day. This protection necessarily includes rides to and
from the courthouse every day for the rest of his tenure on the bench. 104
The Internal Revenue Service ("IRS"), in a maneuver that defies belief,
determined that the car ride to the courthouse constitutes taxable
income. 0 5 Judge Duffy observed the "silliness" of the decision and
lightheartedly discussed the constitutional implications of the tax.'0 6 In
particular, he reportedly gave the IRS "an A plus in tax law" but noted
their "difficulty with the United States Constitution. ' 007 That is, a federal
judge's salary cannot be reduced while in office. 108
On a much more somber, but equally incredible note, two defendants
in the criminal prosecutions following the 1993 World Trade Center
bombing moved to have Judge Duffy recuse himself.10 9 The defendants
based their motion on the fact that information had come to light regarding
their own alleged plan to "kidnap[] and possibly hurt[] an unnamed federal
judge""0 and a prosecutor." The defendants and their arguments, a
caricature of "unclean hands," did not prevail."12 Judge Duffy's denial of
103 Yousef 327 F.3d at 173.
104 Taxed Judge Scolds I.R.S., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1993, at B3.
15 See id
106 Id.
107 Id. For another instance of the judge's unwillingness to mince words, see United States
v. Tramunti, 377 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). The opinion begins, "John Spurdis is a liar." Id.
108 U.S. CONST. art. HI, § 1.
'o9 United States v. Yousef, No. 93 CR. 180, 1999 WL 714103, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13,
1999).
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Id. at *2-3 ("Now, Yousef and Ismoil seek to benefit from these shenanigans of their
own and upset the convictions each so richly merited.").
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their motion ought to be required reading for all men and women
nominated to the federal bench and anyone who romanticizes the life of a
trial judge. One among several jaw-dropping passages is the following:
It is of particular note that Yousef's threats made absolutely no change in
my life. I have received death threats for the last quarter century. Such
are well known to trial judges. Like most of my colleagues, such threats
do not inhibit the fulfillment of our oath of office to "faithfully and
impartially discharge" the duties of our office. 
113
The Order stands out as understated but articulate evidence of an
unwavering commitment to render justice in the cases that reach one's
docket. Just as death threats are set at naught, normalcy and due process
remain at a premium. Citations pervade the Order. 14 It is a unique blend
of conformity to precedent and absolute defiance of individuals bent on
circumventing the legal process. Judge Duffy sets out in great detail the
reasons underlying his denial of the motion and then moves on to rule on a
discovery motion. Despite what most individuals might view as a life-
changing event, it is justice as usual at 40 Foley Square.
2. Sentencing
As described above, sentencing can be an extraordinarily didactic,
biographical window into a trial judge. It is, as Judge Duffy notes, an area
that defies automation and necessarily cries out for human involvement."
5
The World Trade Center case was no exception. Sentencing procedures
did not permit the imposition of a life term for any of the defendants.
1 6
Instead, the guidelines called for "any term of years."" Judge Duffy
relied upon actuarial tables, computed the life expectancies of all of the
victims from the bombing, and finally came to 180 years. 1 8 Two other
counts of the indictment required thirty years each. This resulted in a final
sentence of 240 years."19 In addition, the judge imposed a fine of 250,000
dollars and an order requiring any profits derived from a recount of the
113 Id. at *3. Upon taking senior status six years ago, Judge Duffy wrote a letter to President
Clinton in which he described his continued commitment to providing "substantial judicial
service." Today's News Update, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 18; 1997, at 1.
114 See Yousef 1999 WL 714103, at *2-3 (citing at least six cases that establish the high
standards necessary for a judge's recusal).
115 See supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text.
16 The niceties of the complex sentencing issues have been described at length. See, e.g.,
United States v. Salameh, 261 F.3d 271, 275 (2d Cir. 2001); Richard Bernstein, Trade Center
Bombers Get Prison Terms of 240 Years, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 1994, at AI.
117 Bernstein, supra note 116, at Al.
118 Id.
119 Id.
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bombing to go directly towards restitution for the families of the victims. 120
As one commentator noted, the sentence was "unusual but
appropriate .... a year behind bars for every year of life taken from their
victims., 12 1  The sentence speaks for itself and has garnered ample
commentary. 122 Needless to say, the judge was called upon to inject a
human, creative element into the sentencing process, and he answered the
call.
3. A Penny for your Thoughts, Billions for a Leak
High profile criminal defendants almost inevitably mean that the road
to an impartial trial will be filled with obstacles. Perhaps chief among
such impediments is incredibly pervasive press coverage of the
proceedings. To put it mildly, if lambs played nearly as large a role in
document production as they did just two centuries ago, this trial would
likely have put the species on our nation's endangered list. Kevin Duffy,
however, does not have a publicist. The extensive ink in periodicals only
spelled an enormous jury pool and difficult choices regarding an
appropriate venue. 12 3 Mustering substantial creativity, the judge developed
an unprecedented gag order worthy of the massive media interest in the
case, "$200 for the first blab and [a] squar[ing of] subsequent fines:
$40,000, $1.6 billion, etc.' 24  One commentator noted that the Order
would either "ensure a fair trial" or "retire the national debt., 125 One
scholar, Professor Abraham Abramovsky of Fordham Law School, praised
the judge for "stem[ming] ... an inevitable tide of prejudicial
information. . . about terrorism."' 126  The most notable and celebrated
imprimatur came from on high-retired Chief Justice Warren Burger of
the United States Supreme Court. He noted that "[N]o
prosecutor.., should ever, except in the most remarkable situation, ever
make out-of-court statements about a pending case, especially a highly
controversial case... Judge Duffy should be commended and other judges
should take note."'127 The seemingly extreme gag order, when viewed in
120 Id.
121 Fit Penalty for Terror, and Murder, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1994, at A22.
122 See, e.g., id.
123 See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
124 Judge Imposes Costly Gag Order, CHI. TRiB., Apr. 4, 1993, at 12. The Second Circuit,
in a brief Per Curiam Opinion, disagreed with Judge Duffy. The Second Circuit panel vacated the
order. United States v. Salameh, 992 F.2d 445, 447 (2d Cir. 1993).
125 Judge Imposes Costly Gag Order, supra note 124, at 12.
126 Larry Olmstead, In Trade Center Bombing Case, Two Rights Collide, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
29, 1993, at B3.
127 Chief Justice Warren Burger, Address at the Robert Taylor Memorial Lecture at the
University of Tennessee (Apr. 13, 1993).
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light of the widespread media coverage and a national sentiment pregnant
with the possibility of retributive prejudice, was in fact a measured
response in pursuit of conducting the trial in its entirety within the four
walls of the courtroom.'
28
CONCLUSION
The advent of terrorism in America and an unsettling dearth of
integrity among some of our nation's top executives are two of the many
signs that we are at the start of a new page in our history. If this most
recent decade is at all indicative of days to come, we find ourselves at the
start of a taxing and heart-rending rite of passage in the life of our nation.
An independent, self-sacrificing, and erudite judiciary has the potential to
be an immeasurably significant curb on the excesses that currently
confound America. Dating well into the last century, Commanders-in-
chief have selected the men and women that comprise our federal judiciary
today. Presidents face the Herculean task of selecting jurists, not for a
term of years, but essentially for the remainder of the judges' lives. The
President is called upon to nominate bright men and women with a durable
commitment to neutrality and justice.
If sheer brilliance were the driving factor behind judicial nominations,
we could do away with the Senate Judiciary Committee. The hallowed
space in which they confer could be replaced with a high school
gymnasium, a stack of Scantrons, and a standardized legal examination.
Fortunately, the President, the Committee, and the entire Senate instead
probe potential candidates regarding the application of their often-immense
intellects to the legal process. Ideally, those charged with populating our
judiciary seek out the rare combination of fidelity to one's oath of office
and the skills necessary to discharge the duties thereof.
In his selection of Kevin Thomas Duffy, President Nixon found just
such a combination and demonstrated true prescience. In deciding to make
this Regional Administrator of the SEC one of the youngest federal judges
in the nation, the President must have seen in this thirty-nine year-old man
the potential for enduring dedication to justice and vast reservoirs of
energy. Like so many of his colleagues, Kevin Thomas Duffy has
demonstrated that he is a repository of significant wisdom. Fortunately for
litigants appearing before him, this judge, to whom so much has been
128 Judge Duffy's commitment to avoiding the deleterious effects of media coverage in the
courtroom is well documented. See, e.g., United States v. Meyerson, 677 F. Supp. 1309, 1313
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) ("The United States Attorney's motion for my disqualification apparently arises
out of my long-established and oft-stated belief that cases should be tried in the courtroom and
not in the newspapers.").
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given, has exceeded expectations and tirelessly applied that wisdom for
more than thirty years.
Saint Francis of Assisi is celebrated for his paradoxical admonition to
his thirteenth-century colleagues, "Preach always, when necessary use
words." This saint, it seems, understood that track records and reputations,
like images, are worth a thousand persuasive words. More recently, Chief
Justice William H. Rehnquist has spoken out in favor of repealing the
legislation that allows for monitoring federal judges with respect to the
sentences they impose. It is an unfortunate state of affairs that the Chief
Justice's words are even necessary to point out that "naughty" and "nice"
lists are the exclusive prerogative of Santa Claus and not the Executive
branch of our government. Keeping tabs on judges in this way seems not
only untoward, but also unsound. It runs counter to their individuality and
independence upon which we rely so heavily. In assessing the wisdom of
constraints such as these lists, a close reading of the Almanac of the
Federal Judiciary should suffice. See, e.g., The Honorable Kevin Thomas
Duffy.
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